This attack involved attackers setting up a large number of Tor nodes to quickly compromise the security and anonymity of the network. The Lizard Squad attack on Tor following their MSN and XBox DDOS attacks is a good example. If an attacker runs both, they can fairly easily identify users with their activities. Just 5 percent of relays transport 50 percent of the traffic. For a fairly modest investment, attackers can acquire and operate enough relays to make the probability that they will control the first and last hoops in a chain fairly good, at least over a period of time. Many “bad actors,” from criminals to nation states, run Tor nodes for the purposes of tracking or otherwise harming users. Unfortunately, this breaks down in the face of reality. Tor assumes that your connection is encrypted end-to-end, so there are no worries about interception of data in transit. User traffic typically is sent through three “relays” run (in principle) by three different people. The core foundational concept for Tor is that a user should never have to place all of their trust in any one entity. Unfortunately, some fundamental problems exist - problems you cannot simply patch because they are fundamental to the architecture and philosophy of the system. It was created by a bunch of smart and talented folks. When many people reach for an anonymity tool, they reach for Tor, and that is understandable because it is well known and the price of FREE is very attractive.

Tor network security